My current research project is a monograph on grace and the corresponding virtue of graciousness. More generally, it is about love.
I wonder why it is so hard to be good. So I also write on akrasia (doing exactly what you know you shouldn't do), hatred (of others, of human beings in general, of oneself), regret, shame, despair and the epistemic impulses.
You may download my c.v. here.
"Grace and Alienation"
Philosophers' Imprint (forthcoming).
"Two Problems Posed By the Suffering of Animals"
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 33: 2 (2019), 324-339).
"The Undesirable and the Adesirable,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Published online 2017.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility IV (2017).
"Boredom and the Divided Mind,"
Res Philosophica, 92:4 (2015) 937-957. (Special Issue on Virtues and the Emotions)
Drafts available upon request:
1. "‘I Love Women’: A Non-Implicit Explanation of Implicit Bias Test Results"
2. "Faultless Self-Wreckage" (under review)
ABSTRACT: Since his discussion of a lorry driver who faultlessly runs over a child, philosophers have challenged Bernard Williams’ claim that it may be rational for an agent to feel agent-regret for her faultless actions. Here, I focus on cases of faultless self-wreckage, in which agents faultlessly bankrupt the projects that gave meaning to their lives. Given the importance of meaning in life, an ethically significant way in which an agent can be responsible is to be responsible for the loss of meaning in her life – though she may not also be morally responsible for this loss. That theories of moral responsibility will not capture cases of faultless self-wreckage is no weakness of those theories. Rather, I argue that we should instead see the place of such theories: as offering conceptions of forms of responsibility that co-exist with other, non-moral, but nevertheless ethically important, forms of responsible agency. I discuss the real example of a man who faultlessly killed Prometheus, the oldest tree in the world.